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1. Parmenides and Herakleitos 
 
Some look to holy books for hints, even gems; some to literature; others to the wiser scientists and 
statesmen.  Philosophers on the hunt have always had the riddle-like fragments of the Pre-Socratics, 
the tantalising remains brought to us care of the destruction of the great library at Alexandria.  Strip 
away the details, the dust of subtle squabbles, and we recover at the core the worlds of Parmenides 
of Elea and Herakleitos of Ephesos1.  Their accounts offer two fundamentally incompatible 
outlooks; namely, that things all somehow comprise one and the same ever-lasting structure, and that 
things, all of them, the structure included, change unendingly and irreversibly.  Both outlooks have 
been re-visited many times.  In our time, the ancient quarrels and insights re-surface in the question 
of sustainability which is yet another take on the irresolvable tension of trying to make sense of 
staying the course on that which cannot but change course. 
 
Parmenides' world is a pristine unity, fixed in its essence, stable, reliable, eternally the same: 
 
- It is all one to me where I begin; for I shall come back again there... 
- For this shall never be proved, that the things that are not, are... 
- One path only is left for us to speak of, namely, that It is.  In this path are very 
many tokens that what is is uncreated and indestructible; for it is complete, 
immovable, and without end.  Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now it is, all at once, 
a continuous one.2 
 
Whatever metaphysical mileage about the nature of Being can be drawn from Parmenides, the less 
controversial themes of fixity, order and regularity in nature - what eighteenth century philosophers 
confidently labelled the rerum natura - has enjoyed a remarkable run, at least heuristically.  The 
fixity of species was not seriously challenged until the nineteenth century.  The fixity of the 
chemical elements did not show signs of stress until the uneasy acknowledgment of radioactivity.  
The fixity of the stars held out until modern cosmology.  Prout’s hypothesis, thought dead for 
decades, was posthumously vindicated with the discovery of isotopes.  Indeed, our approach to the 
world has been governed by the  search for natural kinds or essential primitive stuffs with all their  
                                                          
1 Both Herakleitos and Parmenides are said to have flourished around 500BC though the records are not entirely 
consistent.  See John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy  4th edition, (Adam & Charles Black: London, 1930): 130-1, 
169-71. 
2 From John Burnet, op.cit.:173-75. 
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Parmenidean fidelity.  The ongoing program has been “to cut nature at its joints”.  And how else can 
one conceive the search for and identification of  universal constants and conservation laws, the 
backbone of so many discovered relations? Nor is Parmenides gone from the scene if we consider 
the allure of the latterday search for constancy evident in the Gaia hypothesis and the many 
ambitious appeals to equilibrium, homeostasis, recurring closed cycles, and systemic stability in 
nature.  It is from this metaphysical soil that the practical ideal of sustainability has grown, one 
current belief being that we have somehow strayed from and even begun to upset the underlying 
Parmenidean propriety of things. 
 
That said, there isn’t much question that Herakleitos is the man of the hour, and has been for a while.  
For Herakleitos, all is eternal flux, strife, chaos, confusion, inconstancy: 
 
[10] Nature loves to hide... 
[20] This world, which is the same for all, no one of gods or men has made; but it 
was ever, is now, and ever shall be an ever-living Fire... 
[32] The sun is new every day. 
[39] Cold things become warm, and what is warm cools; what is wet dries, and the 
parched is moistened. 
[43] Homer was wrong in saying: "'Would that strife might perish from among gods 
and men!'.  He did not see that he was praying for the destruction of the universe; for, 
if his prayer were heard, all things would pass away. 
[66] The bow () is called life (); but its work is death. 
[81] We step and do not step into the same rivers; we are and are not.3 
 
Recent Herakleitean assaults have battered the discreteness of natural kinds.  Darwin and Wallace 
shook up our conception of fixed species, while Becquerel and Curie had their effect on our picture 
of the not so elemental elements.4 Differences in kind became differences in degree, and in some 
quarters the plenum has re-asserted itself.  What we were once compelled to call distinct species are 
really just  passing stages in longer processes, no more real as entities unto themselves than 
adolescence or middle-age.  Subsequent strikes were directed at certainty and prediction, nor were 
space and time themselves spared.  Stalwart LaPlaceian physical determinism gave way to  
                                                          
3 John Burnet, op.cit.: 133-9. 
4 That said, it is only fair to acknowledge the belief in transmutation which was the backbone for centuries of the 
alchemical program.  See,  e.g., J.M.  Stillman, The Story of Alchemy and Early Chemistry (Dover: New York, 
1960); also Henry Leicester, The Historical Background of Chemistry (Dover: New York, 1971). 
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fundamental indeterminacy and uncertainty.  At an earlier stage, these uncertainties and vanishing 
borders would have been a call to arms, for probabilities could then be addressed as temporary 
deficiencies, as nothing more than indices of ignorance, mere symptoms of insufficient information.  
But that seems not to have been the remedy.  Indeed, there seem to be no reliable remedies for 
fundamental uncertainties.  That seems to be the way things really are, all the way down to some as 
yet bottomless bottom of things.  And we have become increasingly resigned to, if not comfortable 
with, the thought that we may have to live in theory with an ineradicable chaos.  Such seems the 
message in some recent concessions to the special place complexity, fuzziness and paraconsistent 
logics must be accorded, concessions which have prompted serious consideration of the irreducible 
non-linear quality of  natural processes.  Perhaps the most forceful of Herakleitean strikes, one 
closest in spirit to his emphasis upon Becoming or change, has been the increasing recognition that, 
not only does the flux go down as far as one can go,  but that the essence of things, all things, is 
historical.  We discover not just passing changes in some underlying stable substrate; rather the 
story is one of perpetual, irreversible, unrepeatable change as such.  What look like reliable general 
patterns turn out, when we get the scale right, to be temporary patches of passing calm.  The image 
of the fleeting stability of the odd isolated vortex in a turbulent stream which invariably gives way to 
the forces of dissolution and randomly re-asserts itself elsewhere has come to suggest a model of the 
way things are.  This irascible evanescence attaches not just to the surface irritations of climate,  
landforms, magnetic polarity, population fluctuations, and the like, but has been taken up in 
cosmology itself, Big Picture science, which has become increasingly more friendly to the notion 
that there is nothing more to be told than a story of impermanence, an extraordinarily complicated 
story at that.  Things just change. 
 
Also worth noting is that the Herakleitean turn, well entrenched in the physical and biological 
sciences, has recently, however belatedly, engaged the human sciences and humanities.  Some of 
what is called ‘postmodernism’ has fixed upon the fragmentary, frantic, and centreless quality of 
contemporary culture, its loss of focus, of tradition, of direction, of stability, and ultimately of 
meaning and purpose.  More benign variants emphasise the special status of the local and the 
regional, and see in the elemental plurality and variety a hope for a new type of emancipation, 
freedom from the brutality that always comes with the forceful denial and bludgeon-like centralising 
‘correction’ of the real differences in humans and their lives.  Conformity does not conform to the 
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 way things are.5 Whatever the moral to be drawn, few these days can happily cloud their vision so 
utterly as to under-estimate the ever-shifting bittiness of things, what Louis MacNiece once called 
“the drunkenness of things being various”.6 
 
 
2. Two Dimensions of Sustainability 
 
My aim in what follows is to examine aspects of sustainability in the light of the Parmenidean and 
Herakleitean pictures.  For surely if ever a notion drew heavily upon assumptions about the nature of 
the world, this is one of them.  But we must be careful.  Sustainability itself has at least two 
dimensions, one of which falls squarely within and the other squarely outside of the metaphysical 
tension just surveyed..  I will call the first the Nomic dimension, and the second the Prudential 
dimension.  In brief, the Nomic dimension characterises and assesses sustainability in reference to 
certain hard features of the world and relies, thus, on a species of Parmenidean assurance which 
turns out to be untenable; the Prudential dimension pegs sustainability principally against the 
achievement of maximal foreseeable benefit and operates outside any commitment to the 
fundamental nature of the world.   
 
 
3. The Nomic Dimension: Sustainability sub specie aeternitatis 
 
Consider first the Nomic dimension in regard to dealing with talk about sustainability.  Whether we 
refer to the sustainability of a given state of affairs or a continuous process is not germane here; nor 
is it significant at this level of characterisation to distinguish between sustaining  a fixed state, a rate 
of change of state, a rate of a rate of change, and so on.  What kinds of states of affairs or processes 
are sustained does not matter much either, whether we talk generally about sustaining life on earth, 
crop production, social harmony, biodiversity, and the like.  What matters is that all sustainability 
talk relies to some extent upon a notion of permanence, steadiness over time. 
                                                          
5 A refreshingly clear and readable survey of postmodern trends is Hans Bertens, The Idea of the Postmodern 
(London: Routledge, 1995).  A useful sourcebook is T.  Docherty (ed): Postmodernism: A Reader (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993). 
6 Louis MacNiece, “Snow”. 
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At this level of description, sustainability talk points to a relation between things skeletally captured 
in the sentence frame: X sustains Y .  The notion of ‘sustains’ here can be substituted by expressions 
like ‘maintains’ or ‘preserves’ though these are ultimately replaceable by more abstract functional 
relations.  The general formula X sustains (maintains) Y  represents a species of causal relation.  So, 
we are entitled to think of Y as the effect of some causal agency X.  Thus: X sustains (maintains) Y 
entails the claim that X causes (brings it about that) Y.  We can replace Y by any number of states 
of affairs or processes; while X represents whatever causal factors which are causally sufficient 
and/or necessary for that which is sustained.  The variety of causation makes a difference, for it 
cannot be true that every causal relation is also a sustenance or maintenance relation.  To make of 
the causal relation a proper sustenance relation we need to add a temporal rider to rule out episodes 
involving one-off causes; e.g. whereas a comet striking the earth may cause the end of life on the 
planet, such a comet scarcely sustains or maintains the end of life.  Similarly, whereas my buying a 
single winning lottery ticket may cause me thereby to be rich, that ticket itself does not sustain me in 
wealth.  On the other hand, the causal influence of the sun on the earth regarding the presence of life 
is a relation of maintenance or sustenance.  The easiest modification is to add a continuity operator 
giving us something like: Continuously [X causes Y].   
 
There are problems with this formulation, but it will serve our present purposes.  Most importantly,  
the truth of claims of continuous causation relies upon a law-like relation between X and Y such that 
we can assert confidently: “Were it not for X, the ongoing presence of Y would be in jeopardy”, or 
“Were X continuously available, then so too would Y be continuously present.” As for the relative 
vagueness of the notion of causality, this is often dispensed with by making Y a function of X over 
time, where changes in the value of Y can be mapped quantitatively against changes in the value of 
X.  That said, mere numerical functions have a way of smudging over the differences between so-
called real or necessary connections in the world and stable concomitance.  While it may be true that 
there is a reliable function linking the number of livers a creature has with the number of  hearts it 
has, its having that liver is scarcely a cause let alone an explanation of its continuously having that 
heart. 
 
The belief that these law-like relations underwrite the truth of maintenance claims is at the core of 
the Nomic view.  Whence come these law-like continuity relations? They are written into the very 
nature of the world and are indistinct from any of the other law-like relations we have discovered 
that hold between things.  To ask about sustainability in this sense is simply to ask about what law- 
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like regularities of continuous causation hold between certain things or processes.  The details derive 
from empirical investigation into continuous processes.  It does not matter what we ask about.  Here 
are some typical questions all of which reach out for causal laws concerned with the continuity of 
states or processes: What is it that keeps a grizzly bear alive during hibernation? What is it that 
keeps a steady stream of alpha particles flowing from a chunk of radium? What is it that keeps a 
mammal’s body temperature reasonably constant? What is it that maintains a steady rate of 
employment? What is it that ensures a minimum murder rate? What is it that can maintain a constant 
torque? And so on.  The answers are assumed to be available in principle, and any shortage of 
answers can be traced back to factors which contingently have kept us from establishing the relevant 
causal regularities.  The main thing distinguishing such questions from ones like “What brought 
about the extinction of  the sauropods during the late Cretaceous?” or “What brought down the 
Communist government in Soviet Russia?” is the continuity factor. 
 
There is something very appealing about the Nomic dimension, but its very appeal rests upon its 
disarming simplicity.  I will indicate a few of its limitations by way of providing a reason to press on 
to less stable conceptions. 
 
First and prominently, the Nomic dimension is entirely neutral as to the tenor or significance of its 
findings.  Within the Nomic conception, interests and direction are incidental.  Just as one can 
discover laws which explain what causes ongoing maximal biodiversity, so one can explain what 
causes minimal ongoing biodiversity.  Just as one can offer causal regularities which account for a 
steady state of maximum employment, so one can uncover causes which ensure a continuing 
increase in the rate of unemployment.  The significance of the causal regularities themselves, their 
normative interest, cannot be established within the Nomic view or by its practitioners.  This merely 
underlines the truism that the search for knowledge is not at all the same thing as the search for the 
significance of knowledge.  The Nomic dimension provides merely an environment of inquiry within 
which we consider what we deem to be relevant sustainability relations. 
 
Secondly, the Nomic view is neutral with respect to the nature, presence, and frequency of 
countervailing factors.  There is clearly something gappy about any formula of the form 
Continuously[F(x,y)] which usually appears as a simple F(x,y).  Regarding countervailing factors, 
apart from the usual disclaimers about the known defeating conditions of any continuous causal 
process, there are ghostly legions of unknown defeating conditions the full extent of which can  
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never be known.  But this is just part of the standing uncertainty of science; hence, the ever-present 
eminence grise of the ceteris paribus -  ‘all things being equal’ - rider behind any generalisation.   
 
Thirdly, the Nomic view must remain ever coy about the significance of the extent of the temporal  
dimension.  The extent of the temporal dimension - just how long can this go on? - also relies upon a 
ceteris paribus rider.  But this latter item hits substantially more awkward obstacles than the 
unavoidability of ignorance and incomplete knowledge.  Here is where Parmenides meets 
Herakleitos.  Herakleiteans tell us that we are reasonably entitled to assume that nothing whatever 
will go on indefinitely.  Even if whatever complex stable processes in motion do not actually 
degenerate - as they all must - before our eyes into the maximally stable, maximally simple, 
maximally lifeless state of maximum entropy, they will nonetheless surely change utterly one way or 
another.  Circumstances cannot always be equal.  Some butterfly in Beijing will surely flap away 
sometime and throw the whole thing off track.  The more complex a state of affairs, the less likely it 
is to persevere.  There is no perpetual motion machine.  Our very best sustenance equations work 
best with the very simplest and most isolated of circumstances.  The things that matter to us are 
invariably complex.  The Nomic view, as if unmindful of the Herakleitean reminder, tends to operate 
as if Parmenides were in charge for the time being. 
 
“Who cares?” might be the reply.  “Close enough for jazz”, some might retort.  “In the long term, 
we’ll all be dead”, say the fans of Keynes.  To these responses, just two reflections, one direct and 
one not so direct.  The direct response is that the Nomic view as a scientific conception is obliged to 
take in the Big Picture and to accept the neutrality of scale.  Some might even quietly rejoice in 
knowing that, whatever our present course, nature will re-assert itself.  Taking a palaeontologist’s 
long-term view, Stephen Jay Gould is not ruffled by what he regards as the pseudo-crisis of 
sustainability.  The extraordinary phyletic variety of the Cambrian lovingly documented in Gould’s 
book Wonderful Life came and went.7 A few big mudslides might have done in dozens of wholly 
distinct phyletic lines the survival of which would have given us a world utterly unlike the one we 
basically lucked upon.  The late Permian decimation saw the end of the vast majority of genera 
which had chugged along in fits and starts for a few hundred million years.  The late Cretaceous 
blowout ensured freakishly that the little hairy beasts who hid out in holes and scrambled for dear 
life between the toes of the tyrannisaurids would inherit the earth for their time -as once did slightly  
                                                          
7 See Stephen Jay Gould, Wonderful Life (New York: W.W.  Norton, 1989), a stunningly  engaging account of the 
reconstruction of the Burgess Shale undertaken by Harry Whittington, Derek Briggs and Simon Conway Morris. 
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larger slightly less hairy beasts in their own time, ones we call the Assyrians, Egyptians, 
Macedonians, Athenians, Persians, Romans, Spaniards, French, English, and now Americans.  As 
Gould puts it: 
 
We are virtually powerless over the earth at our planet's own geological time scale.  
All the megatonnage in our nuclear arsenals yield but one ten-thousandth the power 
of the asteroid that might have triggered the Cretaceous mass extinction.  Yet the 
earth survived that larger shock....We fear global warming, yet even the most radical 
model yields an earth far cooler than many happy and prosperous times of a 
prehuman past.  We can surely destroy ourselves and take many other species with 
us, but we can barely dent bacterial diversity and will surely not remove many 
million species of insects and mites.  On geological scales, our planet will take good 
care of itself and let time clear the impact of any human malfeasance.8 
 
In a recent radio interview, Gould’s otherwise favourite rival, Richard Dawkins mused in like 
fashion that the end of things as we know them is, from the standpoint of evolution, no shame and no 
tragedy, but just more natural history, humans now occupying a role in the biosphere akin to just 
another nasty passing comet on target, however slower the descent.  Indeed, Dawkins contemplated 
with some affection the advent of a world a mere 20,000,000 years on, long past our certain 
disappearance, in which natural selection, playing with the rubble left after the human impact, has 
re-fashioned an entirely new, entirely wonderful, and utterly unpredictable biota.  Here are the 
voices of happy Herakleiteans, for whom strife, chance, and catastrophe are the engines of all that is 
fascinating and good in creation.  The magnificent mystery lies not in sameness, not in holding the 
course, not in wishing to embalm the present, but in invention, creativity, chance, and change. 
 
Indirectly, to say “Who cares about the long term?” is tantamount to saying “Who cares about the 
ultimate course of the world?” But to adopt that view is not only to abandon the Parmenidean credo; 
it is to forsake the scientific perspective which is otherwise committed to following where the world 
leads.  Put more bluntly, the present sustainability crisis has very much less to do with biology, 
geophysics, and atmospheric chemistry than it has to do with human welfare and flourishing.  The 
pertinent scale is not terrestrial, let alone cosmic.  The scale is plotted out against  
                                                          
8 Stephen Jay Gould, "The Golden Rule - A Proper Scale for Our Environmental Crisis" Natural History (Sept.  
1990): 24-30. 
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human lifespans, the very distant future conceived as the time of our great- and maybe perhaps 
great-great-grandchildren.  This is certainly not grand evolutionary or paleontological opera.  It’s not 
even mildly visionary.  Despite our supposedly heightened sense of time, our modern sophistication 
bequeathed to us by the power of Big Scale science - astronomy, cosmology, geology, evolutionary 
theory - we seem to have become increasingly frantic about ever more attenuated and compressed 
blips of passage.  Instead of being comforted by the promise of eternal renewal and novelty, we 
seem to care more than ever about what happens next - next generation, next decade, next year, next 
day, next meeting.  We seem, in other words, to have found a way to extricate ourselves from the tiff 
between Parmenides and Herakleitos, and to have discovered ultimate meaning instead in our own 
prospects for experience.  But this is nothing more than to turn our gaze away from the world itself 
and time, and instead to look down at our clumsy feet and to ask what might be involved in watching 
our step.  Prudence, it seems, has ever so much stronger a draw than the laws of nature. 
 
 
4. The Prudential Dimension: Sustaining Collective Self-love 
 
I have suggested that there are too many problems with being a Nomic Parmenidean to give us any 
reasons to believe in sustainability let alone plan to implement reliable strategies in its name.  Nomic 
Herakleiteans9, represented in the Gould-Dawkins approach, take solace in the fact that, whatever 
we do, it will all change anyway, and, happily, nothing we can do constitutes anything like as 
disastrous an impact as the earth has suffered and will suffer in future.  That humans will not prevail 
forms part of the Big Picture. 
 
Within the Nomic dimension of sustainability, the moral seems to be: Side with Parmenides and  
lose; side with Herakleitos and resign.  At best the Parmenidean can assume stability and regularity 
only in highly circumscribed contexts.  The large scale offers just the history of passage.  For the 
Nomic Herakleitean, nothing privileges or favours the short-term over the long-term.  To adopt the 
big scale Herakleitean view requires that we regard maintenance and sustenance to be supremely 
unnatural.  There is something inherently artificial in  a reasonably permanent complex state of low  
                                                          
9 Strictly, ‘Nomic Herakleitean’ is an oxymoron if ‘nomic’ is reserved for hard causal regularities.  The sense I 
intend for it here reflects more on the strong presence of the Herakleitean view in certain Big Picture scientific 
approaches which accept that nomic regularities may themselves just be temporary historical aspects of an otherwise 
anomic development of things through time. 
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entropy.  Indeed, if sustenance were burned into the nature of things, there would be no scientific 
reason to regard it as a priority since there would be nothing needing doing. 
 
So, the only grounds for response regarding sustainability in a Herakleitean universe is not its 
naturalness but its value to us - hence the Prudential view.  Practical sustainability talk is usually 
about maintaining certain designated desirable states of affairs or rates of increase (as is implied in 
the term ‘sustainable development’).10 The time involved is what we choose it to be.  As such, it is, 
relative to the Nomic view, if not arbitrary, then nothing more than an index of our normative space.  
Since nothing can go on forever, we rest content with the ‘foreseeable future’.  But we have been 
simply hopeless at predicting what happens next year in human history, let alone a generation or two 
off. 
 
The Prudential view effectively works outside both the Nomic Parmenidean and Herakleitean 
stances because it is fundamentally unconcerned about the way things are in the big picture.  The 
basis, on the other hand, for becoming a Prudential Parmenidean rests on the reasonably 
manageable and temporary reliability of conservatism and, relatedly, conservationism.  Prudential 
Parmenideans adopt a quasi-providential view of things expressing not so much the naive “she’ll be 
right, no matter what” but “we’ll see to it as we can that she’ll be right”.  Since nature calls all the 
shots, the Nomic Parmenidean has in the end to give in to Herakleitean pressures.  The Prudential 
Parmenidean, however, sees only heresy, self-denial and self-destruction in the Herakleitean stance.  
What is at stake is precisely not the way the world is.  Indeed, for the Prudential Parmenidean, we  
are the principal agents behind sustainability relations because to sustain is to maximise or at least 
optimise our overall opportunities for exercising ongoing determinable preferences.  The 
sustainability issue becomes a cluster of technical problems, and not strictly an open-ended course 
of scientific inquiry.  The problems, assumed throughout to have solutions, are driven by our goal of 
maximising continuous opportunity in the context of recognisable constraints and uncertainties 
imposed upon us by the world we set about altering in the name of maximising opportunity.  What 
the Prudential Parmenidean asks, in the light of human interest and natural resistance, is simply this: 
How far and how hard can we push for our goals before we hit self-destructive barriers? No one is 
better able to answer such questions than the engineer. 
                                                          
10 Note that we do not generally talk about sustaining rates of decrease.  We may wish to lower population growth and to 
decrease consumption of land and other resources, but we don’t think of these reductions as the end of sustainability 
initiatives.  They are, rather, means alone. 
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Of course, the engineer as engineer cannot determine what those goals are, what losses or risks are 
acceptable in their pursuit, and how and when such goals may be revised in the light of revisions in 
our expectations.  Nor can we hope for much insight by appeal to simple prudence either, for that too 
will never show itself as a monolithic consensus.  It is only fair to say that prudence can 
accommodate a range of interests such as spiritual and aesthetic ones which save it from becoming 
little more than just another form of careful industrial expansionism.  That said, however, the ends of 
the prudential approach are pretty limited because the identifiable goods are pretty simple.  
Complicate the notion of goods, and the question of sustainability becomes well-nigh intractable in 
practise - at least, this seems to be one message from the current political strife over social equity 
and standard of living versus long-term nature conservation and preservation. 
 
How is Prudential sustainability meant to be manifested? We assume that we cannot merely press 
against things as we wish without an eventual self-defeating cost.  So, we adopt in our prudence a 
strategy of cautious care.  Caring about the end of maximising our opportunities, we come to care 
about how we treat the means to such an end; and caring about the means can involve caring for 
them.  Whether this caring for manifests itself variously as utilitarian management or affectionate 
protective regard is not pertinent here.  What is pertinent is that the relationship is not grounded in 
mutuality nor is it at all equal in terms of responsibilities, expectations and license.  Probably the 
most popularly advocated form of agency proper to the prudential stance is stewardship, the heritage 
of which some derive from the most ancient religious texts and traditions.  Stewards are caretakers 
and bound to act on behalf of those under their care.  Prudentialists generally dispense with the idea 
that our stewardship is an appointment of sorts to look over someone else’s goods for safekeeping.  
Outside religious conceptions of stewardship where we are bound to safeguard the creation of a 
divine being, we are self-appointed stewards.  But as such, we must also take ourselves to stand in a 
relation of dominance and greater wisdom over our wards.  Otherwise, we could never act properly 
as responsible stewards. 
 
But if the Prudential Parmenidean is a self-appointed steward over that which will maximise or 
optimise ongoing opportunity for exercising preference,  the question of  competence arises.  
Prudence like Science rests on what we can claim confidently to know.  Once again, the Nomic 
Herakleitean barges in with a reminder.  Stephen Jay Gould  again: 
 
We are one among millions of species, stewards of nothing.  By what argument could we, 
arising just a geological microsecond ago, become responsible for the affairs of a world 4.5  
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billions years old, teeming with life that has been evolving and diversifying for at least three-
quarters of that immense span? Nature does not exist for us, had no idea we were coming, 
and doesn't give a damn about us.11 
 
What does this come to? There is no escaping the big picture.  If we don’t like the nihilism or 
fatalism of Herakleitos’s world, we do not thereby acquire any magical self-guiding wisdom by 
simply ignoring it.  That no one who has more than incidental acquaintance with the violin can 
declare himself without embarrassment or arrogance to be a violinist is a commonplace.  Think how 
much more grotesquely inept it must be for us (indeed, who among us?) to declare ourselves 
stewards of everything whatever.  That we have an upper-hand of sorts is perhaps true (though 
Gould reminds us that we can’t even take credit for that).  That we should suppose this to qualify us 
for stewardship is simply presumptuous.  Even if we understand our own goals (and whose might 
these be?), there is no reason to presume these to be compatible with our own continuity, let alone 
that of our natural ward. 
 
 
5. Giving and Taking - the Costs 
 
The Nomic stance works against sustainability as a feature of things because we suspect this is 
not the way the world works.  The Prudential stance works against sustainability as a realisable 
or even appropriately identifiable goal because we are bound to suspect that we know too little 
about ourselves and what we want, and about the way the world works to prescribe confidently 
any stable technical or ideological fix.  Is it all then, at best, just another instance of frantic 
scrambling - supposing there to be a problem or crisis at all? 
 
What is it that we want? Is it perhaps a set of technical prescriptions of the form: Do this, and 
we’ll be able to continue to have health, warmth, food, water, shelter, security and comfort for as 
long as we can see (if not imagine)? Do this, and the variety of life as we know it will carry on? 
Do this, and things will never get uncontrollably worse, never get hopelessly troublesome, never 
get incurably desperate? If sustainability cannot be a metaphysical credo, perhaps it is no more 
than another type of millenarianism.  Having abandoned the immortality of the soul - the 
ultimate in sustainability - our time opts for an eternity of benign control and regulation. 
                                                          
11 Stephen Jay Gould, “The Golden Rule”, op.cit.. 
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 If nature, as Gould says, doesn’t give a damn about us, and if we seem characteristically blinded 
by our own illusions of grandeur, neither science nor prudence seem to offer a proper guiding 
hand.  It is for this reason that some have urged us to re-assess the state of our souls.  Some, for 
example, think our pre-occupation with human welfare the principal source of the problem.  So 
we are advised to re-think our place in the world.  There are many who advocate undoing 
centuries of self-glorification and self-concern.  The messages are familiar: we must be humble 
and respectful, not vainly superior and exploitative; we must be caring and nurturing, not 
domineering and opportunistic; we must identify goods that are not our own, and not reduce all 
interests to those that serve us best; we must blend in, and not separate ourselves out; we must 
act mutualistically and not individualistically; we must recognise values that are intrinsic, and 
not see the world as an instrument to serve our self-serving ends; we must think in terms of the 
grandest collective and community, and not merely in partisan terms.  And so on. 
 
What it actually takes to create and make effective such changes of attitude is beyond me, 
though these present day utopian strains form part of a litany going back a few good years.  Not 
too long ago, sustainability found a geo-political voice in the goal of peaceful co-existence; 
before that in the goal of unity among imperial nations; before that in the goal of the one empire 
on which the sun never set; before that in the goal of a unity of faith.  It has had a voice in 
worries about harvests and droughts, in worries about invasion and insecurity - in worries 
generally about anything prone to throw things off course. 
 
The ongoing moral is pretty clear.  We value such things as peace, continuity, stability, harmony, 
permanence, constancy, reliability, and the like.  But these cannot be read without a touch of 
revisionism out of the Book of Nature.12 Where change is contemplated as desirable, we want to 
be in charge as the unchallenged agencies of change, and the changes themselves which are 
valued tend to be those meant to re-assert the values of continuity and stability.   
 
The trouble, of course, is that such values are neither clear nor sanctioned by nature.  But there is 
a further consideration with which I will close; namely, that whatever ends we adopt, we are 
playing at best a very provincial game and one ultimately and unavoidably at the mercy of the 
Herakleitean picture.  Here in a nutshell is the game. 
                                                          
12 On changes in such readings see Donald Worster’s penetrating study of ecological norms in Nature’s Economy 
(Cambridge University Press: New York, 1994). 
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With any effort at sustainability, no matter the beneficiary, you cannot maintain everything at 
once.  There is no steady state or steady process sustainable in all things all at once and all the 
time.  To maintain any steady state or process in any one thing or process requires that some 
other state or process changes.  Where we can exercise some control in halting the flux, we 
thereby acquiesce to change - unsustainable change in principle - in one given less valued sector 
to ensure partial stability in another more valued sector.  This is a perpetual case of borrowing 
from Peter to pay Paul.  Where possible, sustainability is unavoidably local or provincial.  The 
larger the province sustained, the greater the change to accept in the remainder.  For every 
sustained state, then, there is a cost in decreasing sustainability in some other state.  Of course, 
we can contemplate questions of efficiency, but in the end we trade something off.  The chief 
questions then concern what to invest our efforts at shoring up in, and more impenetrably, why? 
Very broadly construed, the issue is ultimately economic; that is, it concerns at bottom the 
determination of acceptable costs and risks.  And, as many have come to suspect, any proposed 
solutions in the name of acceptable costs always re-visit the problem of  represented and 
unrepresented interests, a problem the solution to which is required before any talk of local 
maintenance makes any sense. 
 
 
6. Tradeoffs 
 
Mentioned above is the tradeoff factor involved in any sustainability initiative; i.e., that gains in 
sustainability in one area will be bought at a cost of losses elsewhere.  This needs elaboration if 
only because the general interest in sustainability seems to be based upon its representing a 
general and enduring condition of stability.  This cannot be so if such a condition relies upon 
continual losses. 
 
We seem to have learned that certain goals we have pursued,  such as a continual rate of 
industrial growth in certain sectors, though sustainable in principle, becomes increasingly more 
costly to sustain.  That is, we have come to a stage where the costs in the form of increasing 
depletion of certain resources are thought to be no longer necessarily worth bearing.      It is 
likely that any effort to sustain rates of increase in one sector will have to be met by losses in 
another.    We cannot, for example, hope to increase food production without a cost in soil 
quality or depletion of natural habitat or disturbance of marine ecosystems.       So, where we  
 14
wish to maintain increases of any sort, the price will come in the form of depletion or 
degradation or some other negative impact elsewhere. 
 
All this is predicated, of course, upon our recognition of loss.  It is only fair to remember that 
there was a time when the clearing of land was not thought to be a loss of any sort, but an 
unequivocal improvement.  Perhaps what distinguishes our time is an increasing concern that not 
many improvements, if any, will be bring only good news.  ‘Win-win’ contexts belong with 
perpetual motion machines.  Such awareness has obviously struck regarding fertilisers and 
pesticides, nuclear power, and - perhaps the most pervasive force of all - modern medicine and 
general sanitary measures which have immeasurably improved individual human lives at the cost 
of increasingly cluttering our planet with more and more of these improved lives. 
 
Sustainability initiatives are not all about maintaining increases.  What of the idea of holding 
course? Throughout, I have played on the reminder that things change.  The implications for 
holding the course are clear.  To maintain a steady-state, one must be prepared for random 
external disruptions to the state, ones that tend to throw it off course.  To return it to the state 
desired, what we deem 'normal', requires the use of resources external to the sustainable context.  
So, if we wish to maintain a certain steady crop yield, and if we face drought, say, or flooding, or 
any  other of the plagues, and if we decide to take measures to minimise our losses, those 
measures used constitute a cost of a sort which either distract us from pursuing other 
maintenance-preserving initiatives or which actually require a decline in other contexts.  Water 
diversion is a typical case in point.   
 
What of cases where we do not  necessarily  have  to consider  the costs involved with 
unexpected and damaging disruptions to the steady state we seek?  Even the notion of 
maintaining  a  reasonably  comfortable indoor temperature through means  which seem 
otherwise to be unconnected with existing surface processes has run into trouble.       I refer to 
the use of oil and gas which, as drawn from deep in the earth, do not in their depletion have as 
such any direct effect on  surface  phenomena.   In principle, indeed,  the use of oil and gas 
should be far less disruptive of surface phenomena than the use of water.  But such has not 
proven to be the case.  Oil spills and gas well blowouts besides,  the very byproducts of our use 
of such substances are taunting us in the form of air pollution, greenhouse gas effects and 
undegradable  plastics  to name but three.   If we search for alternative non-fossil and non-
organic fuels, we can no longer be so naive as to ignore inevitable side-effects, some of which  
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will be in themselves potentially disruptive.  To maintain any steady-state costs; i.e., the 
maintenance of any steady-state comes at the expense of the neglect or even degradation of 
another.  The major deciding factors concern what we actually care about, and how much we 
care. 
 
I would venture to say that many heartfelt initiatives to attack problems of unsustainability in 
agriculture, population growth, natural resource and land use, and various social phenomena will 
generate in their solutions new instabilities.  Reducing consumption obviously has many side-
effects.  The question is not so much whether we can create a new equilibrium of sorts by having 
less of everything.  Of course we can.  The question is whether whatever new equilibrium sought 
in one sector is worth the cost in equilibrium reduction in another.  These costs are all manifestly 
'unreal' in that they are mere registers of what matters to us.  This itself makes the sustainability 
issue somewhat ghostly in substance. 
 
 
7. Postscript on the Nomic Stance and on 
 Self-respectful Unobtrusiveness 
 
The contrast between the Nomic and Prudential dimensions mirrors the contrast between the 
Objective and Subjective points of view.  Even if we adopt any Nomic stance, we still lack 
grounds for concern about sustainability.  The Nomic Herakleitean tells us that nothing lasts and 
so the will to sustain is a wasted gesture.  The Nomic Parmenidean would argue that because 
there is no change of any moment other than the local illusion of disruption, the will to sustain is 
similarly wasted, not because it is hopeless but because it is unnecessary.  What is paramount is 
the perspective we adopt. 
 
Through the Nomic lens, we  must include ourselves within the general scheme of things, 
whatever shape that takes.  Within that scheme, there is no privileged place for human interests 
or meanings.  Elsewhere, I described such a view as acentric.13 The Prudential perspective 
locates  itself  emphatically  within the  anthropocentric   field.   Note,  even  the  more  
expansive  conceptions  of  centrism  such  as biocentrism are still prone to perspectival  
                                                          
13 See Stan Godlovitch, "Ice Breakers: Environmentalism and Natural Aesthetics", Journal of Applied Philosophy 
(1994).  Where we fit and how we function under the Objective and Subjective points of view has been 
breathtakingly explored in Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford University Press: New York, 1986). 
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privilege.  But the universe as such, and our study of the universe as such holds no special place 
for perspectival  
privilege - or even for life.  Once we remove ourselves as ourselves out of the picture entirely - 
the effect of the Nomic viewpoint - no place remains for any meaningful talk of sustainability.  
Once we infuse talk of sustainability with significance, we must accept that we have set aside 
our distanced objective understanding of the world, and have opted for the comfortable and 
familiar inescapability of species-centredness.  Once this recognition is accepted, we can at least 
recognise that we are dealing with interests and values alone, and the question turns in deceptive 
innocence to figuring out how we can get what we want. 
 
If this all sounds pretty much another case of damned-if-we-do and damned-if-we don't, let me 
close with a slight if slightly hopeful programmatic prospect.  Like any species, we are driven to 
expand and flourish where we can.  Unlike most other species, we have beaten the natural 
selection hurdle remarkably well by having had extraordinary success in transfiguring much of 
the external environment into an instrument of our own welfare rather than a threat to and 
constraint upon it.  We do not depend in any biologically interesting way upon the external 
forces governing individual variation, differential reproduction and adaptation to ensure our own 
continuity.  Adaptation is, for us, a technical and not a genetic issue.  But the Herakleitean 
picture still sets the ultimate constraints.  Species are just temporary points of focus.  In 
recognising, from the vantage point of the Nomic, our own fundamental provinciality, we may at 
least conjecture thus: that we are just passing through and will vanish as has everything else, 
perhaps even life itself.  Whether as a matter of morals or manners, it may seem fitting that, as 
passers-by, we try at least to leave things much as we found them, not so much on behalf of the 
next generation of our own kind but more on behalf of regard for own reflective capacities, of 
the value we place in understanding the Big Picture, out of self-respect.  It's not that we don't 
belong here; rather, it's that we certainly won't belong here forever.  This makes a supreme virtue 
of unobtrusiveness.  Once we figure out how to leave each other alone, we may have time to get 
round to the rest. 
